Welcome to the symposium: Cognitive Vulnerability: An Epistemological Approach
Bienvenido al simposio: Vulnerabilidad Cognitiva: una aproximación epistemológica
All lectures will be streamed online via google meet. To attend in online mode just register here.
Todas las charlas serán transmitidas online vía google meet. Para asistir en formato online tan sólo hay que registrarse aquí.
Ever since Peirce coined the term “fallibilism”, the idea that cognitive human achievements are fallible has played a central role in contemporary discussions on knowledge. However, this term overloads the epistemic dice more towards the possibility of making mistakes than towards the possibility of cognitive success. Realist and anti-realist philosophers of science share the view that we are fallible beings but draw opposite conclusions from it. Based on an optimistic meta-induction on the history of science, realists tend to think that we are approaching truth, our ingrained fallibilism notwithstanding. Anti-realists, on their part, favour a more negative stance. Relying on the validity of a pessimistic meta-induction, they hold that all our theories have been, and probably are and will be, false, although increasingly successful from an empirical and instrumental point of view. The dichotomy between realism and anti-realism may have its origin both in the fallibilistic background that they both share and in the idea that everything that the epistemologist and philosopher of science could say about our cognitive achievements has to be finally worded in terms of truth, or approximation to truth, and falsehood. The time is ripe to think about epistemological alternatives to both ideas. This symposium will be devoted to exploring, on the one hand, whether there are some options to fallibilism from which we could equally stress the possibility of cognitive success and not only of failure. The idea of cognitive vulnerability is meant to encompass both of them. On the other hand, we will explore if there are epistemic results of our practices of inquiry that can be reduced neither to the notion of truth, or approximation to truth, nor to the notion of falsehood. The notion of cognitive verisimilitude is one such possible option.